What Survives the Shift from Text to Pixels? Conditional Protection against Prompt Injection in Image-Rendered Documents
This arXiv paper studies indirect prompt injection when multimodal language models answer questions over external documents, comparing text and page-image versions of 191 English QA sources across six models. Rendering untrusted content as images reduces marker-appending and answer-formatting execution for every model, but Qwen3-VL-8B still executes image-borne answer replacement at 77.96%. Protection varies by target type, rendering settings, wording, and repetition, and an eight-candidate attack search largely closes the image deficit for Qwen and Gemini but not GPT-5-nano. Clean-question utility ranges from 93.31% to 101.61%, though Qwen drops to 61.99% when answers require combining two evidence spans.
It provides concrete measurements of when image rendering mitigates prompt injection and when it fails, helping teams evaluate multimodal document security by model, operation, and attack budget.
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