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arxiv

CapLite: Prompt-Injection Defense for Small Language Model Agents without Model-Written Security Artifacts

The paper examines whether small language model agents can be trusted to write the security artifacts used by enforcement-based prompt-injection defenses. Across 15 open-weight models, it reports that model-written policies, graphs and constraints still admit attacks against many models, while CaMeL's programs fail to run in up to 68% of episodes. CapLite instead derives its policy from tool schemas, commits write calls before reading tool results, and only admits writes whose affected recipients, amounts, objects or destinations are stated in the user's request. It reports no successful attacks across 13,935 attacked AgentDojo episodes, with utility under attack of 29.0% versus CaMeL's 27.2% and 17.1k tokens per episode, 18% of CaMeL's token use.

AI Brief

It offers a concrete defense design and evaluation for securing small-model agents against prompt injection without relying on model-generated security policies.

arXiv:2611.17115v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enforcement defenses against prompt injection, such as CaMeL, Progent, IPIGuard and DRIFT, ask the agent's own model to write a security artifact (a program, a privilege policy, a dependency graph or a constraint list) that code then enforces. We ask whether small language model (SLM) agents can be trusted to write these artifacts. Across 15 open-weight models, 13 of them between 1.7B and 12B parameters, they cannot: the policies, graphs and constraints that the agent's model writes admit attacks on 14 (Progent), 13 (IPIGuard) and 11 (DRIFT) of the models, and CaMeL's programs fail to run in up to 68% of episodes. We present CapLite, which derives its policy from the tool schemas, commits the write calls before any tool result is read, and admits a write only if every argument that decides whom or what it affects is stated in the user's request. This guarantees write integrity: injected text cannot add a write, and no write reaches a recipient, amount, object or destination that the user did not state. No attack succeeds in 13,935 attacked AgentDojo episodes. CapLite reaches utility under attack comparable to CaMeL's (29.0% vs. 27.2%) with fewer tokens than every other enforcement defense and than the undefended agent: 17.1k per episode, 18% of CaMeL's, and the highest utility per token of all enforcement defenses.
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